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Abstract 
 
 
This paper exploits a little used data resource within the central registry of the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to analyze cross border 
flows of allowances for compliance purposes during the first trading period (2005- 
2007). The extent of cross border trading is small in the aggregate but remarkably 
frequent in matching allowance deficits and surpluses at the installation level 
throughout the EU. As such, these data provide evidence of the high and wide-
spread market participation that is the precondition of efficient abatement in a cap-
and-trade system. There is also remarkable little difference in the monetization of 
allowance surpluses between participants in the EU15 and those in the East 
European New Member States. Finally, comparison of these data with the more 
commonly reported data on allocations and verified emissions reveals considerable 
recourse to a novel feature of the EU ETS:  borrowing from the next year’s allocation 
to satisfy current compliance requirements.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The political acceptability of the cross-border flows in international allowance 
trading has figured importantly in the discussions of future global climate regimes, 
but to date there has been no empirical data upon which to base this discussion. As 
the world’s first multi-national trading system, the European Union’s CO2 Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) now provides a much needed reference point. The EU 
ETS also contains another novel feature, borrowing, that has not figured in these 
discussions and which has affected the timing of cross-border trading. With the first, 
trial period of the EU ETS now over, data from the Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL) can be used to identify and analyze cross-border trading and 
borrowing, as well as the origin of the banked allowances that expired worthless at 
the end of the trial period. 
 
This paper presents and analyzes the CITL data on cross-border trades, 
borrowing and banking during the just-concluded first trading period of the EU ETS. 
The next section of this paper distinguishes compliance trading from financial 
trading, explains the CITL surrender data that provides the basis for this analysis, and 
discusses the trading implied by the net short and long positions of Member States. 
Section 3 presents and analyzes the actual cross-border flows. The time pattern of 
these trading strongly suggests borrowing and this is the subject of section 4. Section 
5 addresses banking and the origin and potential causes of the allowances that expired 
worthless at the end of the first trading period. The final section concludes. 
 
2 Definitional and data preliminaries 
 
2.1  Compliance and financial trading 
 
A distinction needs to be drawn between trading that is motivated by 
compliance needs and that motivated by financial or hedging considerations. 
Compliance trading is a fundamental underpinning of a cap-and-trade market and it is 
what is modeled and discussed in simulations of trading in a global system. However, 
compliance trading is not the only, or even the main, reason for participating in actual 
allowance markets. Most trades are motivated by financial considerations, such as 
hedging forward positions, instead of compliance. For instance, a power company 
wishing to lock in the price of carbon implied in a forward power contract will 
typically purchase a futures contract for allowances of the same maturity as the power 
contract. The distinguishing feature of financial trading is that typically a transfer of 
allowances does not take place. The power company will usually sell the futures 
contract before maturity and in so doing it will have effectively eliminated any loss or 
gain from a change in the carbon price between the time of the forward power 
contract and the actual delivery of the power with its embedded carbon and the 
associated allowance liability. 
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In the EU ETS, as in other cap-and-trade systems, compliance consists of 
surrendering tradable rights to emit, called European Union Allowances (EUAs), 
equal to emissions. Compliance is recorded in accounts associated with each emitting 
installation that are maintained in registries. These registries record the initial 
allocations to installation accounts, all transfers in and out of accounts, and the 
annual surrender of allowances for compliance. In the case of the CITL, which is the 
central registry for the EU ETS, data is provided for the holding account of every 
affected installation. These accounts record the annual allocation of allowances to the 
installation, its emissions for the year, and the number of allowances surrendered in 
compliance. In addition, the registry of origin for every surrendered allowance is 
reported, although not the identity of the installation to which the allowance was 
initially issued.  
 
2.2 Presentation of the CITL surrender data 
 
The CITL surrender data are publicly accessible, but not easily analyzed and for 
that reason few analysts have exploited this data resource.1 Absent a specially 
designed data retrieval program, the analyst would need to consult and assemble data 
from over 10,000 separate installation holding accounts in the CITL. The results 
presented here are the result of a data retrieval program that has been developed by 
the Mission Climat of the French Caisse des Dépôts et des Consignations in Paris for 
the purpose of supporting a broader research project of which this paper is part. 
 
Appendices one through eight present the surrender data as 25 x 25 matrices by 
year and for the period as a whole.2 The first four tables present the gross flows, that 
is, all 625 possible combinations of the registries of issue and surrender. The cells 
along the diagonal in these matrices indicate the number of allowances that were 
issued by and surrendered in the same Member State. Cross-border flows are 
indicated by all the off-diagonal cells of which there are 600. The last four appendices 
present only the net cross-border flows, that is, after compensating imports or 
exports are netted out. In these appendices, positive entries indicate net export from 
the country indicated at the row heading, and negative entries are imports into that 
country. The entries in appendices five through eight are symmetric but of opposite 
sign with respect to the diagonal. For instance, the net flow between Austria and 
Belgium for the period as a whole (appendix 8) is 10,000 EUAs from Austria to 
Belgium. In Austria’s row this flow is entered as a positive number under the column 
heading for Belgium and as a negative number in Belgium’s row under the column 
heading for Austria. 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is Kerr (2007), which presented some surrender data for the 2005 and 
2006 compliance years. 
2 In order to focus on the 25 Member States who participated for all three years, Bulgaria and 
Romania are excluded. Both had problems getting their registries operating in 2007 and there are 
only a small amount of cross-border imports reported for Romania. 
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Appendices one through four clearly show that most allowances are 
surrendered in the same registry in which they were issued since the largest entries are 
those in the diagonal cells. When the diagonal cells are summed and compared with 
the total surrender for all the EU, the difference indicates the number of allowances 
that were involved in cross-border trades, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Basic Allowance Accounting, 2005-07 Combined. 
 
Million EUAs (% of total) 2005 2006 2007 2005-07 
Surrendered in MS where issued 1,611 (97.9%) 
2,300 
(96.4%) 
1,879 
(88.9%) 
5,791  
(94.2%) 
Surrendered in another MS 34 (2.1%) 
85 
(3.6%) 
235 
(11.1%) 
354  
(5.8%) 
Total 1,645 2,385 2,114 6,145 
 
Note: Registry problems in several Member States, mainly Italy, France, the Czech Republic, and 
Spain, caused many allowances for 2005 compliance to be surrendered after April 30, 2006, and 
thereby to be reported in 2006.  
 
The percentage of allowances being transferred across borders for compliance 
increases in each year and is equal to 5.8% for the period as a whole.3 That most of 
the allowances are surrendered in the Member State in which they are issued should 
not be surprising. Most of the allowances initially allocated to an installation remain 
in that installation’s holding account and are surrendered against emissions from that 
installation. What are traded are the expected or actual differences between emissions 
and allowance allocations. This “own allowances first” behavior is a critical 
assumption in the analysis that follows. It is supported by anecdotal evidence, but it 
cannot be confirmed until the CITL data on the installation origin of surrendered 
allowances is made publicly available five years after the surrender date. 
 
Table 2 presents an extract of data from appendix four, in this case, for Germany 
for the period as a whole with respect to both the origin of allowances surrendered 
against emissions in Germany and the registries in which allowances issued by 
Germany were surrendered against emissions throughout the EU ETS. Where 
another country is involved, the first column indicates allowance imports into 
Germany and the second column, exports from Germany. The net position for these 
trade flows is also shown.  
 
                                                 
3 An additional 378 million EUAs, constituting the surplus for the trial period, were authorized and for the 
most part issued, but never surrendered. 
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Table 2 – Example of CITL Surrender Data: Germany, 2005-07 
 
Million EUAs 
Surrendered in Germany 
originating from … 
Originating in Germany 
surrendered in … 
Net import 
by Germany 
Germany 1391.2 1391.2  
Czech Republic 7.1 0.1 6.9 
France 6.7 0.1 6.6 
Poland 5.3 0.2 5.1 
Netherlands 7.3 2.8 4.5 
Belgium 4.0 0.8 3.2 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
Slovenia 0.0 0.4 (0.4) 
Austria 0.5 1.0 (0.6) 
Spain 1.0 3.5 (2.5) 
United Kingdom 8.4 11.3 (2.9) 
Italy 1.3 5.4 (4.2) 
Grand Total 1448.1 1418.4 29.7 
 
Several features stand out and these are generally true for all Member States. 
First, as previously noted, most of the allowances issued and surrendered do not 
cross a border. Second, for any given trading relationship, cross-border trading is 
usually characterized by flows in both directions. Finally, the net position with various 
trading partners is in both directions. For instance, Germany is a net importer over-all 
and in most of its trading relations with other Member States, but it is also a sizeable 
net exporter in its trading with the UK, Spain, and Italy. 
 
Figure 1 presents two other examples of data extracts from appendix four. 
The first panel shows the origin of all the allowances surrendered in the UK, which 
was the largest importer of EUAs. The second panel shows the registry in which 
allowances issued by Poland, the largest exporter, were surrendered for compliance. 
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Figure 1 – Example of CITL Surrender Data: origin and destination of allowances 
 
Origin of EUAs surrendered in the UK Destination of Poland’s EUAs 
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1%Spain
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These diagrams show again that most allowances are not involved in cross-
border trades. The percentages that are involved vary from country to country. For 
instance, for the period as a whole, the percentage imported ranges from 17% for the 
UK, to 0% for Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg. The export share ranges from 33% 
for Lithuania to 0% for Malta. Malta, with its two installations and a registry that was 
two years late in being established, was the only Member State that did not participate 
in any cross-border transfers. 
 
2.3 Installations positions and implied cross-border transfers 
 
If it is assumed that the owners of installations surrender the allowances allocated 
to them first before making any sales or purchases in the market, the differences 
between annual emissions and the allocation for that year would indicate the potential 
extent of trading. Each long installation (allocation > emissions) is a potential seller; 
and each short installation (allocation < emissions) is a potential buyer. These 
installation differences can be easily calculated and it can be readily verified that 
virtually all installations are either potential buyers or sellers. In fact, there are only 27 
instances out of some 30,000 observations over the three-year period that have 
emissions exactly equal to the annual allocation. And, there were only three 
installations out of some 10,000 for which emissions and allowances were exactly the 
same for each of the three years.  
 
These installation differences can be summed in any number of ways, and several 
articles have reported on these differences and the implications for trading (Ellerman 
and Buchner, 2007; Kettner et al., 2007). A common presentation of the data and the 
one of interest from the standpoint of cross-border trades is by Member State as 
shown in Figure 2 for the trial period as a whole. 
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Figure 2 – Gross and Net Positions of Member States (2005-07 Combined) 
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Note: calculations do not take the use of reserves into account 
 
The orange bars indicate the sum of the shorts, that is, the extent to which the 
emissions exceeded allowances for all the installations that were short for 2005-07. As 
can be readily seen, there were short installations in virtually every Member State and 
the total across all the Member States was 650 million tons (Mt), about 11% of the 
EU-wide cap. The green bars reflect the sum of the longs, the corresponding figure 
for all the installations with emissions less than the allowance allocation for the 
period. Long installations are found in every Member State and the total for these 
surplus allowances is 808 Mt. The blue parts of these bars indicate the net position of 
each Member State, the extent to which it is on balance long or short. When the 
installation differences are aggregated to this level, the UK, Italy, Spain, Ireland, 
Slovenia and Greece are short for the period as a whole. All the other Member States 
are long. 
 
These data indicate that at least 650 million EUAs were transferred from long 
installations to short installations for compliance over the course of the three years. 
This defines the minimum size of what can be called the compliance market. 
Moreover, the net positions of the Member States also indicate that there were cross-
border flows.  
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2.4 New entrant and other reserves 
 
The data just presented reflect the initial allocations to existing installations, not 
the total number of allowances that Member States may have issued. Many Member 
States held back authorized allowances to provide free allocations to new facilities 
(new entrant reserves) and four Member States held back some allowances for 
auctioning (Fazekas, 2008a). Also, some Member States require installations that 
cease operations to forfeit post-closure allowance allocations. Thus, the allocations to 
installations reported in the CITL understate the total number of allowances allocated 
to the installations in some instances, and overstate the number in others.4  
 
To make things a little more complicated, not all allowances as approved by the 
Commission were distributed. Installations in several Member States, especially in the 
UK, exercised the opt-out provision and the allowances authorized for them were 
cancelled. EUAs forfeited under the closure provisions, as well as any unclaimed in 
the new entrant reserves were annulled in some Member States, but sold in others. As 
a result, neither the approved Member State totals nor the sum of the allocations to 
installations as reported in the CITL reflects the total number of allowances available 
for compliance. If the true short or long position of Member States is to be 
calculated, account must be taken of the allowances distributed to new entrants or 
through auctions and other reserves, as well as any undistributed forfeitures for 
closure. Figure 3 below shows the effect of the various reserve provisions on the net 
positions of Member States5. 
 
                                                 
4 Often these installations can be identified since all installations with allocations or emissions have 
accounts and report emissions. Installations that report emissions but no allocation are new entrants 
and invariably they have received allowances. Similarly, installations showing an allocation but no 
emissions are candidates for forfeiture, depending on the specific provisions of the Member State’s 
National Allocation Plan. New entrant allowances were also awarded for expansions of existing 
facilities so that the initial allocation reported for an installation in the CITL is not necessarily the 
complete allocation to that installation in a given year. See McGuinness and Trotignon (2007) for a 
more complete discussion of this problem and examples from the UK, Spain, and France. 
5 Data on forfeited allowances are generally not available and where they are the numbers are small. 
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Figure 3 – Potential Impact of Reserve Use on Member States Positions 
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The effect of including these additional reserves is two-fold. First, the net surplus 
of the EU ETS as a whole for 2005-2007 is increased from 158 Mt to 378 Mt. 
Second, the net positions of the Member States are changed. Two of the Member 
States that were short at the installation level, Ireland and Greece, switch from being 
net short to net long. Moreover, the need for cross-border transfers by the remaining 
Member States with net short positions, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Slovenia, are 
significantly reduced, from 229 Mt to 89 Mt. Since the net long or short positions of 
Member States are typically small percentages of the total allocation, reserves that are 
sometimes as much as five percent of the Member State allocation can have a big 
effect. The short Member States held back more allowances from the initial 
allocations to installations than other Member States and this accounts for the large 
effect that these reserves had on their net positions. 
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3 The extent of cross-border EU compliance trading 
 
3.1 The density of compliance trading 
 
One of the most remarkable features of the matrices of flows in appendices one 
through four is what might be called the density of trading, that is, the number of 
possible trading relationship that occurred. Visually, the density of trading is reflected 
by the number of filled off-diagonal cells. Table 3 presents these data for trade 
among the EU15, between the EU15 and the EU10, and among the EU10 for each 
year and for the period as a whole. 
 
Table 3 – Density of trades by region 
 
 Possible 2005 2006 2007 2005-07 
Intra EU15 210 102 (49%) 128 (61%) 160 (76%) 174 (83%) 
EU15 w/EU10 300 54 (18%) 104 (35%) 149 (50%) 168 (56%) 
Intra EU10 90 8 (9%) 19 (21%) 39 (43%) 43 (48%) 
Total 600 164 (27%) 251 (42%) 348 (58%) 385 (64%) 
 
The growth in these trading flows expanded steadily over the three years of the 
trial period. By the end of the period and for the period as a whole, more than half of 
the possible trade flows have been realized. The participation of different Member 
States in these trade flows also differs, as shown by Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 – Participation of Member States in EUA cross border flows 
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The axes in this diagram indicate the number of Member States for which a trade 
flow has occurred during the trial period, whether an export (horizontal axis) or an 
import (vertical axis). Thus, the maximum number of such flows for any Member 
State in either direction would be 24. No Member State has this number because 
Malta did not trade with anyone. Cyprus and Luxembourg did not import any 
allowances, but they exported allowances to eight and nine other Member States, 
respectively. For all other Member States, trade flows occurred in both directions. 
The most significant cluster is at the upper right-hand side of the graph where 
fourteen Member States, representing 90% of the EU-wide cap, experienced trade 
flows in both directions with more than 15 other Member States. Although these 14 
high density traders are mostly EU15 states, the presence of Poland and the Czech 
Republic among them is notable. Another seven Member States had trade flows in 
one direction with more than fifteen partners, but not as many compensating flows. 
Slovenia and Ireland imported from most possible partners, but as countries with a 
net short position, their exports were more limited. Similarly, the five Member States 
directly below the large circle exported allowances to more than fifteen other 
partners, but as East European Member States with net long positions, their imports 
were less, especially for Latvia and Estonia. Greece stands alone with relatively 
balanced trading relationships, like most of the rest of the EU15, but with fewer such 
relationships than most of the others. 
 
3.2 Net Import and Export Positions by Member State 
 
A significant feature of the surrender data is that the net import and export 
positions do not match the net short and long positions exactly. The latter have a 
strong influence but they are far from determining. Since supply exceeded demand, it 
is not surprising that Member States that were net long were not able to export all of 
their surplus allowances. What might be considered more remarkable is that Member 
States that were in a net short position imported more than what was needed for 
compliance. Also several countries that were in a net long position were net 
importers. The most important of these was Germany, which was long by 46 Mt 
including reserves but was a net importer of 30 million EUAs. Figure 5 makes the 
comparison between the net trading positions (green bars) and the net long/short 
positions (purple bars). 
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Figure 5 – Net flows and net position comparison (Mt), 2005-07 combined 
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An immediate question arises as to why more allowances than would be needed 
for compliance would be imported in Member States that are short. The short answer 
is that in every Member State there were some issued allowances that were never 
surrendered and that may never have left the holding accounts to which they were 
issued. Any such hoarded or inactive allowances issued by Member States that were 
short would have necessitated more imported EUAs to cover domestic emissions. A 
more complete discussion of this phenomenon is the subject of the penultimate 
section of the paper. 
 
Table 4 shows the net export and import flows of Figure 5 in tabular form with 
net exporters and importers arranged according to whether they are part of the EU15 
or a New Member State, as well as the flows for each year. 
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Table 4 - Net allowance export and import flows by country and year, 2005-07. 
(Million EUAs) 2005-07 2005 2006 2007    2005-07 2005 2006 2007 
EU15 89,61  12,37  26,81  55,37   EU15 -216,52  -21,10  -59,97  -140,38  
France 41,89  5,38  9,50  27,01   UK -106,98  -8,57  -28,71  -69,70  
Netherlands 13,36    6,66  6,99   Spain -41,17  -9,72  -8,34  -23,11  
Finland 9,13  3,26  1,00  4,87   Italy -35,32  -0,35  -16,63  -18,34  
Portugal 6,81    2,47  5,09   Germany -29,72    -4,01  -28,26  
Belgium 6,48  0,91  3,00  2,57   Austria -2,29  -0,76  -2,28    
Denmark 6,26    1,32  5,20   Ireland -1,04  -0,41    -0,86  
Sweden 3,50  0,27  1,07  2,16   Portugal   -0,75      
Greece 1,12  0,00  1,23     Netherlands   -0,28      
Luxembourg 1,06  0,00  0,33  0,72   Denmark   -0,26      
Germany   2,55       Greece       -0,11  
Austria       0,76             
Ireland     0,23               
EU10 128,07  8,73  33,36  85,98   EU10 -1,16  0,00  -0,20  -0,97  
Poland 52,65  0,08  8,92  43,65   Slovenia -1,16    -0,20  -0,97  
Czech Rep. 27,66  5,66  8,86  13,15             
Slovakia 12,03  1,32  3,99  6,72             
Estonia 11,69  1,00  5,71  4,98             
Lithuania 10,93  0,42  2,36  8,15             
Hungary 9,50  0,07  2,80  6,62             
Latvia 3,09  0,17  0,70  2,22             
Cyprus 0,52  0,00  0,02  0,49             
Slovenia   0,01                 
EU25 217,68  21,10  60,17  141,35     -217,68  -21,10  -60,17  -141,35  
Source: Compiled by the authors from the CITL data as of May 13, 2008 
 
Malta, Romania and Bulgaria are not included in Table 4 because the latter two 
joined the system only in 2007 and Malta has not participated in trading at all. There 
was a transfer of 218 million allowances over the three years, although 65% of that 
net transfer occurred in 2007, the last year of the first trading period. Virtually all of 
the import demand was from the EU15 and the bulk of that from four large 
importers—the UK, Spain, Italy, and Germany. The suppliers of this demand were 
about evenly split between other EU15 countries (41%) and the New Member States 
(59%). Three countries—Poland, France, and the Czech Republic—were large 
exporters, accounting for 56% of all net exports. The share of the East in these net 
export flows increased markedly over the three years, from 41% in 2005, to 55% in 
2006, and to 61% in 2007. Although most countries were either an exporter or 
importer in all years, this was not always the case. Germany, Austria, Ireland and 
Slovenia were net importers for the period as a whole, but all were net exporters in 
one of the three years. Similarly, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark and Greece 
 15
were net exporters for the period as a whole, but were net importers in one of the 
years. 
 
3.3 Financial Dimensions 
 
The net transfers of EUAs identified in Table 4 provide one component of what 
is needed to estimate the financial flows resulting from compliance trading. The other 
component, the price at which these transfers occurred, can only be estimated. 
Neither the value of a transaction nor the date of transfer is reported in the CITL 
data. The problem of estimation is made harder by the large fluctuations in price that 
occurred during the trial period. However, surrenders are reported annually so that 
allowances surrendered for 2005 emissions would have been acquired no later than 
April 30, 2006, those surrendered for 2006 emissions no later than April 30, 2007, 
and similarly for 2007 emissions. 
 
One solution to this problem of valuation (and the one adopted in this paper) is 
to assume that surrendered allowances were acquired at the average price for the 
intervals before and between the end-of-April dates when allowances were to be 
surrendered. This solution is equivalent to assuming that the net imports and exports 
revealed by the 2005 data were transacted in equal amounts over the 16 months from 
January 2005 through April 2006, those for 2006 between May 2006 and April 2007, 
and similarly for the final year. It is unlikely that anyone did exactly this, but there is 
no entirely satisfactory solution to this problem. In any case, these “CITL years,” and 
the price behavior and average price during each year are given in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 – Price development on CO2 Spot market during Phase 1 
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Source: Tendances Carbone, compiled from Point Carbon and BlueNext 
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Table 5 provides the financial flows when these average price assumptions are 
multiplied by the quantity flows indicated in Table 4. In this table, export earnings are 
entered as positive numbers and payments for imports are negative numbers. 
 
Table 5 - Estimated Financial Flows due to Compliance Trading 
 
(Million €) 2005-07 2005 2006 2007    2005-07 2005 2006 2007 
Ave Price   € 20,18 € 9,57 € 0,14            
EU15 € 434,1  € 249,6  € 256,6 € 7,8  EU15 (€ 939,6) (€ 426) (€ 574) (€ 20)
France € 203,3  € 108,6  € 90,9 € 3,8  UK (€ 457,5) (€ 172,9) (€ 274,8) (€ 9,8)
Netherlands € 59,1    € 63,7 € 1,0  Spain (€ 279,2) (€ 196,1) (€ 79,8) (€ 3,2)
Finland € 76,0  € 65,8  € 9,6 € 0,7  Italy (€ 168,8) (€ 7,1) (€ 159,1) (€ 2,6)
Portugal € 9,2    € 23,6 € 0,7  Germany € 9,1   (€ 38,4) (€ 4,0)
Belgium € 47,4  € 18,4  € 28,7 € 0,4  Austria (€ 37,1) (€ 15,3) (€ 21,8)   
Denmark € 8,1    € 12,6 € 0,7  Ireland (€ 6,2) (€ 8,3)   (€ 0,1)
Sweden € 16,0  € 5,4  € 10,2 € 0,3  Portugal   (€ 15,1)     
Greece € 11,8  € 0,0  € 11,8    Netherlands (€ 5,7)     
Luxembourg € 3,3  € 0,0  € 3,2 € 0,1  Denmark   (€ 5,2)     
Germany   € 51,5       Greece       (€ 0,0)
Austria       € 0,1            
Ireland     € 2,2              
EU10 € 507  € 176  € 319 € 12,0  EU10 (€ 1,8) € 0,0  (€ 1,9) (€ 0,1)
Poland € 93,1  € 1,6  € 85,4 € 6,1  Slovenia (€ 1,8)   (€ 1,9) (€ 0,1)
Czech Rep € 200,9  € 114,2  € 84,8 € 1,8            
Slovakia € 65,8  € 26,6  € 38,2 € 0,9            
Estonia € 75,5  € 20,2  € 54,6 € 0,7            
Lithuania € 32,2  € 8,5  € 22,6 € 1,1            
Hungary € 29,1  € 1,4  € 26,8 € 0,9            
Latvia € 10,4  € 3,4  € 6,7 € 0,3            
Cyprus € 0,3  € 0,0  € 0,2 € 0,1            
Slovenia   € 0,2                 
EU25 € 941,4  € 425,8  € 575,8 € 19,8    (€ 941,4) (€ 425,8) (€ 575,8) (€ 19,8)
Source: Compiled by the authors from the CITL data as of May 13, 2008 
 
The total value is a little under €1 billion for the period as a whole. However, as 
if to demonstrate the adage that timing is everything, the progressive collapse of the 
first period price after April 2006 imparts a very different time pattern to the financial 
flows from what is observed for the quantity flows. Only two percent of the total 
value is associated with the 2007, which account for 61% of the total quantity.   
 
There are also some interesting changes in position. Poland, which was the 
largest net exporter of allowances, is third in value of exports, behind France and the 
Czech Republic, essentially because the bulk of Poland’s exports occurred later in the 
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period due to the late activation of the Polish registry in July 2006. Equally interesting 
is that Germany, which was a net importer over the period, is a net beneficiary of the 
financial flows since EUA prices were high in the year in which it was a net exporter 
and very low in 2007 when it was a large net importer. Germany’s net exports in 2005 
offset only about 8% of its net imports in 2006 and 2007, but the value placed on 
those exports more than compensated for the cost of the later imports.  
 
Aside from these sometimes significant shifts of Member State positions, the 
broad picture is roughly the same as it is for the quantity flows. Virtually all of the 
import payments are from the EU15 with the UK accounting for about half, and the 
export receipts are split about equally between the EU15 and the New Member 
States. 
 
 
4 The use of borrowing during the first phase 
 
Buying or selling EUAs is not the only alternative available to the owners of 
installations for dealing with the differences between allocations and emissions. 
Operators with installations that are long and decide not to sell the surplus in the 
market can bank allowances for use in a later year. Similarly, operators with 
installations that are short can borrow from the next year’s allocation or used banked 
allowances. While many trading systems allow banking, the EU ETS is unique among 
cap-and-trade programs in allowing borrowing. However, there are several important 
limitations on banking and borrowing in the EU ETS. 
 
The most important is that between the three-year trial period, from 2005 
through 2007, and the subsequent five-year Kyoto period, no inter-period banking or 
borrowing is allowed.  Within the period, there is unlimited banking and borrowing, 
although both options are not available for all years. Since there is no initial bank, the 
use of banked allowances is not feasible for meeting compliance requirements for 
2005. Banked allowances could be used for compliance in 2006 and 2007, but any 
held beyond 2007 would be worthless. Similarly, borrowing is not a compliance 
option for 2007 although it would be for 2005 and 2006 and any borrowing would 
have to be paid back by the end of the period. Also, borrowing can be made only 
from the next year’s allocation since each year’s endowment of allowances is placed in 
installation holding accounts at the end of February in each year, two months before 
the surrender of allowances for the past year’s emissions is required.  
 
Banking and borrowing have obvious effects on market participation. For 
installations that are short, borrowing from the next year’s allocation or using banked 
allowances obviates the need to purchase allowances. Similarly for long installations, 
banked allowances are supply that is not available to the market. Operators might 
engage in such behavior to avoid the transaction costs of equivalent sequential buying 
and selling in the market if they expect alternate surpluses and deficits. 
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4.1 Evidence of borrowing by short Member States 
 
The timing of the volume of compliance trading (see Tables 3 and 4) provides 
strong evidence that operators have engaged in borrowing. The clearest example of 
this behavior is observed in the UK, the Member State with the largest short position 
in all years, as illustrated in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7 –Imports and implied borrowing in the UK 
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The purple section of each left-hand column presents the net short position for 
the year, that is the extent to which emissions exceeded the allowances issued for that 
year. If all the surplus allowances at long installations had been used to cover deficits 
at short installations in the UK, this column represents the required imports to be in 
compliance. In 2005, for instance, the number of non-UK EUAs surrendered for 
compliance was only 30% of this requirement, as indicated by the green section of 
the right-hand column. Since all installations were in compliance, the only explanation 
is borrowing from the 2006 allocation to cover a 70% of the net national deficit, as 
indicated by the tan portion of the column.   
 
In 2006, the net short position was about the same as in 2005, but the previously 
borrowed allowances, indicated by the hatched section made the cumulative short 
position and need for covering imports larger. The number of non-UK allowances 
surrendered was almost equal to the net short position, but it did not cover 42% of 
the cumulative short position, which implied that the 2005 deficit plus the slight 
additional deficit for 2006 was rolled over to 2007. In 2007 the net short position was 
significantly lower (12 Mt instead of 28.7 Mt and 29.6 Mt in 2005 and 2006), but the 
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carried-over borrowing of 21 Mt brought the cumulative short position to 33 Mt. 
However, in this year when borrowing was not possible, the net import level was 
more than twice this level, that is, what was needed to cover the 2007 short position 
and the earlier borrowing.  
 
The explanation is that there was more borrowing by short installations than 
what is indicated by Figure 7. Alternatively, the assumption that all the surplus 
allowances at long installations in the UK were made available to the market to cover 
short positions is not correct. Since it is unlikely that short installations left any 
initially allocated allowances unused, any non-surrendered UK allowances likely 
belonged to long installations in the UK. The excess of non-UK-issued EUAs 
surrendered in 2007 to the cumulative short indicates the extent of these unused or 
“hoarded” allowances at UK installations. The absence of these allowances in the 
market required short installations to purchase more allowances for compliance from 
other Member States. The 37 Mt apparent excess of imports also indicates the extent 
to which borrowing was greater in 2005 and 2006 than shown in Figure 7 since all 
imports are already taken into account. As will be discussed more fully in section 5 of 
this paper, the existence of these unused allowances exists in all Member States, 
whether they were short or long. The effect was to reduce EUAs available for export 
in Member States that were long and increase imports for those that were short. 
 
In interpreting these data for the UK and other Member States, it must be 
remembered that there is no Member State control of these flows. They are the result 
of decentralized actions by operators which are aggregated to Member State level to 
illustrate cross-border flows. Accordingly, the numbers that emerge from this level of 
analysis are minimums. It is unlikely that borrowing was restricted to operators in 
Member States that were short and it is likely that some operators of short 
installations resorted to borrowing, wherever they were located. 
 
4.2 Borrowing at the installation level 
 
In fact, surrender patterns that are consistent with borrowing at the installation 
level are not hard to find. The following result for a generating unit in the 
Netherlands, a Member State that was long in all three years, provides an example. 
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Table 6 – Example of surrender pattern 
 
PermitNumber Country Name Sector 
200400007 NL Essent Energie Productie Clauscentrale 1-Combustion 
          
2005 
Alloc Emis Surr From NL Foreign 
980,550 1,261,844 1,261,844 1,261,844 - 
          
2006 
Alloc Emis Surr From NL Foreign 
980,550 1,434,684 1,434,684 1,434,684 - 
          
2007 
Alloc Emis Surr From NL Foreign 
980,550 1,715,051 1,715,051 - 1,715,051 
          
Surrendered Units 
Year Holding Reg Originating Reg Quantity 
2005 Netherlands Netherlands 1,261,844  
2006 Netherlands Netherlands 1,434,684  
2007 Netherlands Austria   43,106
2007 Netherlands Belgium   24,600
2007 Netherlands Czech Republic   105,440
2007 Netherlands Estonia   188,269
2007 Netherlands France   5,193
2007 Netherlands Germany   30,353
2007 Netherlands Hungary   103,010
2007 Netherlands Italy   20,000
2007 Netherlands Latvia   71,990
2007 Netherlands Lithuania   141,095
2007 Netherlands Poland   688,587
2007 Netherlands Slovakia   56,971
2007 Netherlands Spain   12,118
2007 Netherlands United Kingdom   224,319
 
In every year emissions at Essent’s Clauscentrale were higher than the allocation 
to the installation for that year; and for the period as a whole emissions were about 
1.47 billion tons (about 50%) more than the allocation to Clauscentrale. How Essent 
used the allowances allocated to this unit for these three years cannot be determined; 
however, if they had used each year’s allocation only for compliance in that year, 
there would not have been 1.72 million EUAs from other Member States surrendered 
in 2007. It is possible that Essent covered the 2005 and 2006 deficits with EUAs 
purchased or transferred from other Dutch units and sold the 2007 allocation, but 
this seems unlikely. The pattern of use is consistent with borrowing against the year-
ahead allocation for meeting 2005 and 2006 requirements and then resorting to the 
market to cover emissions in the last year. There is still a question of what happened 
to the 245 million EUAs of Clauscentrale allocation for 2007 that would have been 
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left after borrowing to meet compliance requirements in 2005 and 2006. The 
appearance is that they had been sold before the 2007 surrender date and replaced 
with allowances purchased or transferred from other Member States. 
 
This is not an isolated case. There are 69 other installations that have this exact 
pattern of surrenders:  all domestic EUAs for 2005 and 2006 and all non-domestic 
EUAs in 2007. If the criteria for apparent borrowing is loosened to include 
installations that surrendered more domestic allowances than their allocation in 2005 
and 2006 and fewer domestic allowances in 2007 (instead of none), the list includes 
475 installations in 19 Member States. Table 7 presents the aggregate data for these 
475 installations. 
 
Table 7 – Aggregate results of installations verifying the criteria for apparent borrowing 
 
 Unit: Mt Allocations Verified Emissions 
Domestic EUAs 
Surrendered 
Non-domestic 
EUAs 
Surrendered 
Borrowing 
(Domestic EUAs 
less Allocations) 
2005 
Compliance 
Year 
158.02 195.91 191.04 4.91 33.02 
2006 
Compliance 
Year 
156.62 195.55 186.60 9.03 29.98 
2007 
Compliance 
Year 
158.48 188.36 105.98 83.13 (52.50) 
Entire Period 473.12 579.82 483.62 97.07 10.50 
Note: Since some units surrender more allowances than required, the sum of surrendered allowances 
is in all years slightly greater at these installations than verified emissions. 
 
Again, the time pattern is what suggests borrowing. If none of these installations 
had borrowed, the distribution of domestic surrenders over the three years would 
have been more even instead of falling sharply in 2007. The 10.5 Mt excess of 
domestic surrenders over the allocation indicates simply that some of the domestic 
EUAs surrendered were acquired from other installations in the same Member State. 
 
What distinguishes all of these instances is the surrender of fewer domestic 
EUAs than the installation allocation in the last year of a period in which there could 
be no further borrowing. A greater surrender of domestic EUAs in 2005 and 2006 
alone would not necessarily indicate borrowing since installations could have 
purchased domestic EUAs or transferred them from another installation in the 
Member State. However, it is unusual to find a short installation for which the 
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domestic allowances surrendered are less than the allocation to that installation. Such 
a pattern implies either prior use or sale. 
 
It is not possible to form more than a minimum estimate of the magnitude of 
borrowing in 2005 and 2006. It was not a requirement to pay back borrowing with 
non-domestic EUAs. Borrowing paid back with EUAs obtained from other domestic 
installations surely occurred, but it would not show up with the data that is now 
publicly available. Still, even on the basis of this limited data, it is evident that 
borrowing provided another option for compliance and that a number of installations 
availed themselves of it. The amount of borrowing suggested by Table 7 is small in 
the aggregate, but it is more significant when placed in the context of the short 
installations’ who are the ones that would be interested in this option. The 475 
installations that meet the borrowing criteria used to form Table 7 above constituted 
16% of the 3000 installations that were short in 2005 and 2006 on average; and their 
two-year borrowing of 63 Mt is 15% of the 409 Mt cumulative short positions for 
these two years. 
 
Whether intended or not, borrowing to meet 2005 and 2006 compliance 
requirements turned out to be a very profitable move by those engaging in it. It was 
nevertheless a speculation on future EUA prices, especially for the 2005 compliance 
year when EUA prices were hitting all time highs shortly before the April 2006 
surrender deadline and at least some analysts were predicting still higher prices to 
come.  With no inter-period banking or borrowing, the price at the compliance 
deadline for 2007 emissions would have been either zero or the penalty price of €40 
plus the value of the next period’s allowances (Parsons and Ellerman, 2006). That 
prospect probably explains why borrowing was and would remain limited. 
 
5 Banking and the use of excess allowances 
 
There is an inescapable asymmetry in compliance that makes banking less 
interesting than borrowing. Operators of installations that are short must take some 
action to cover emissions, either acquire allowances from other installations or 
borrow. Operators that are long do not need to do anything. What may appear to be 
banked allowances may reflect inertia instead of a conscious decision not to sell or to 
save them for later use. There is an opportunity cost for failing to sell unused 
allowances when future prices are expected to be lower, but the motivation to do 
something is not the same as that facing the operator of a short installation.  
 
Still, the surrender data do reveal something about banking behavior, again not at 
the installation level, but at the Member State level. Cross-border flows represent 
transfers or sales and therefore they do indicate the share of a Member State’s long 
position that was sold. As such, these data provide some indication of how the 
surplus was used by installations in Member States that were in a net long position. 
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5.1 Utilization of the surplus 
 
The values given earlier in Table 5 provide one estimate of the value of EUA 
exports, but that table does not indicate the extent to which long positions were 
monetized. This number can be estimated and it is presented in Figure 8 for Member 
States with aggregate net long positions. 
 
Figure 8 – Share of the surplus exported (Net Exports/Net Position), by Member State 
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Note: includes 100% use of reserves 
 
The most striking features of this graph are the wide variation in the monetization 
of the surplus and the predominance of East European Member States among those 
with the highest shares monetized among long Member States. The range is from 
almost seventy-five percent for Slovakia and the Czech Republic to twenty-five 
percent for Sweden. The highest ranking EU15 Member State, Denmark, appears 
only seventh in place at about 60%, slightly ahead of Poland.  To the extent that this 
indicator can be taken as a measure of alertness to market opportunities and that East 
European countries would be thought to be less commercially oriented, this is a 
surprising result. 
 
There is also a group of four Member States—Malta, Germany, Austria, and 
Ireland—that were in a net long position for the period as a whole but were not net 
exporters. Malta was simply not a participant in the market. The other three were all 
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participants and all exported some allowances in every year although for the period as 
a whole, they were net importers. The negative entries to the left of the axis in Figure 
8 above reflect the net imports as a percentage of their net long position.6 The 
phenomenon of being in a net long position and still being a net importer reflects a 
circumstance to which we now turn, namely, that at least some of the allowances at 
long installations may never have entered the market. 
 
5.2 The EUAs that expired worthless  
 
The difference between the number of allowances issued and those surrendered is 
the number of allowances expiring worthless at the end of the period. The 
distribution of these EUAs by issuing registry can be readily determined and is given 
in Figures 9 and 10, which present the distribution of expiring allowances in absolute 
terms and relative to the Member State’s total allocation, respectively. 
 
Figure 9 – EUAs expiring worthless by Member State, in volume 
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Note: includes 100% use of reserves 
 
The total number of EUAs expiring unused was 378 Mt. In absolute numbers, 
most of the expiring allowances were issued by the large Member States but some 
came from every country in the EU. A more meaningful Member State comparison is 
                                                 
6 Austria’s percentage is so high only because its net long position was very small. 
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presented in Figure 10, which presents this surplus, as well as other compliance data, 
as a percentage of the Member State’s allocation. 
 
Figure 10 – EUAs expiring worthless by Member State, % 
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The orange and green sections of each bar indicate the share of that Member 
State’s total allowance issue that is accounted for by net export (orange) or net 
imports (green). Verified emissions are represented by the blue sections for the 
Member States with net exports and by the blue plus the green sections for Member 
States that are net importers. In all instances, the hatched black sections shows the 
share of that Member State’s total that was not surrendered in any Member State and 
therefore expired worthless. The UK’s net imports were equal to 15.9% of the 
allocation, but its emissions were only 10.4% higher than the total number of EUAs 
issued. The difference, 5.5%, shown by the black section, is the share of UK-issued 
EUAs that were not surrendered anywhere, as mentioned before in the discussion of 
the UK’s “excess” import of EUAs from other Member States. In the case of 
Germany, emissions were 3.5% less than total allowances issued, but net imports 
were equal to 2.0% of the allocation. Again, the difference, 5.5% (coincidentally the 
same as for the UK), reflects the share of domestically issued EUAs that were not 
surrendered anywhere and which expired worthless. This unused share is what caused 
three Member States--Germany, Ireland and Austria—that were net long to be net 
importers. 
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It is readily evident from the way the Member States are arrayed in Figure 10 that 
net importers tend to have a smaller share of their allowance total expiring worthless 
than Member States in a net long position. This phenomenon probably reflects the 
asymmetry in compliance that was mentioned earlier. The owners of short 
installations can be expected to use every allowance allocated to them, while the 
owners of long installations are under no compulsion to sell. Since Member States 
that are in a net short position will tend to have a higher proportion of short 
installations, there will be less likelihood of unneeded EUAs being left in accounts. 
Also, it is not hard to imagine that for many who had accumulated banks in 2005 and 
2006, whether consciously or not, the motivation to sell evaporated as EUA prices 
collapsed in late 2006 and approached zero for most of 2007. Finally, there were 
probably firms like the two in Malta for which participation in the market seems 
never to have been an option. Similar installations would probably be found in every 
Member State.7  
 
It is also likely that some of the allowances indicated by the hatched sections had 
been sold and were held in other accounts, perhaps but not necessarily in the same 
country. Fazekas (2008b) provides data on the transfers in and out of the Hungarian 
registry which permit some quantification of this effect. Over the first period, 10.66 
million EUAs were transferred from accounts in the Hungarian registry to accounts 
in other Member States and the reverse flow was 1.52 million EUAs. The CITL 
surrender data show 10.42 Hungarian EUAs surrendered in other Member States and 
0.67 million EUAs issued by other Member States surrendered in Hungarian 
accounts. Assuming that all transfers out of Hungary were Hungarian EUAs and that 
none were re-imported, the comparison of these two sets of data indicate that about 
240,000 Hungarian EUAs were traded but expired worthless in accounts in other 
Member States and that 850,000 EUAs issued in other Member States expired 
worthless in Hungarian accounts. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The extent of cross-border trading for compliance in the EU ETS is remarkable, 
not so much for its absolute size and value, both of which are small, but for its 
frequency and density. With the exception of Malta, all twenty-five member states 
participated in some cross border trading and for most Member States trading 
occurred with most of the other Member States, usually in both directions. In fact, 
cross-border trading accounts for more than half of the compliance trading that was 
required to bring all installations into compliance and it was many times greater than 
what would have been needed to assure compliance for the installations in the four 
                                                 
7 This may explain the curious behavior of 38 installations that surrendered in one year or several the 
exact number of allowances issued to them even though their emissions were less. The total excess 
surrender for these units is 322,000 EUAs. 
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Member States that were in a net short position. The explanation for both of these 
features is that trading for compliance purposes was conducted in a decentralized 
manner in an EU-wide market. There were no mercantilist entities within Member 
States directing trade to ensure that all domestic trades were completed before any 
cross-border transfers took place and traders evidently showed no national preference 
for their counter-parties. A market with such high participation is a precondition for 
efficient, least-cost compliance and there seems little doubt that this prerequisite 
exists in the EU ETS. 
 
A particularly noteworthy feature of these data is the lack of any perceptible 
difference in the participation in trading between operators of installations in the 
EU15 and in the new East European Member States. The latter were as active in 
trading, usually in selling their surpluses, as operators with long positions in EU15 
Member States, and in some cases, it would appear more active. For instance, the 
percentage of the surplus sold by operators of installations in Eastern Europe is 
generally higher than the share of allowances sold out of similar surpluses among 
EU15 Member States. The absence of a clear difference between East and West is 
simply one more reflection of the high rate of participation in trading and a highly 
unified allowance market. 
  
The sharply increasing rate of trading for compliance purposes in each of the 
years of the first trading period indicates that a unique feature of the EU ETS, the 
ability to borrow against the next year’s allocation, was used by many participants. 
For the several Member States that were in a net short position in 2005 and 2006, net 
imports were not enough to cover all emissions. Since installations generally 
surrendered allowances equal to emissions, it is evident that borrowing from the next 
year’s allocation occurred. This behavior is also strongly suggested by examination of 
installation level data where a significant number of installations appear to have 
borrowed for compliance in 2005 and 2006 and paid the borrowing back in 2007 with 
large imports of non-domestic EUAs.  Given the evolution of EUA prices during the 
trial period, this was a profitable move. The greater significance of this new 
alternative for compliance is that it was used and that it served to dampen price 
volatility by redistributing demand within the period in a manner that reduced 
demand when prices were high and increased demand when prices were low. 
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Appendix 1: Matrix of gross allowance flows (Mt), 2005 
 
 
 
Empty: 0; Green: less than 1Mt; Orange: less than 5Mt; Red: more than 5Mt 
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Appendix 2: Matrix of gross allowance flows (Mt), 2006 
 
 
 
Empty: 0; Green: less than 1Mt; Orange: less than 5Mt; Red: more than 5Mt 
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Appendix 3: Matrix of gross allowance flows (Mt), 2007 
 
 
 
Empty: 0; Green: less than 1Mt; Orange: less than 5Mt; Red: more than 5Mt 
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Appendix 4: Matrix of gross allowance flows (Mt), 2005-07 combined 
 
 
 
Empty: 0; Green: less than 1Mt; Orange: less than 5Mt; Red: more than 5Mt 
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Appendix 5: Matrix of net allowance flows (Mt), 2005 
 
Note: All figures in the matrix stand for a net transfer from country A to country B. A negative figure (into parentheses) implies 
a positive transfer from country B to country A. The matrix is thus skew-symmetric. 
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Appendix 6: Matrix of net allowance flows (Mt), 2006 
 
Note: All figures in the matrix stand for a net transfer from country A to country B. A negative figure (into parentheses) implies 
a positive transfer from country B to country A. The matrix is thus skew-symmetric. 
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Appendix 7: Matrix of net allowance flows (Mt), 2007 
 
Note: All figures in the matrix stand for a net transfer from country A to country B. A negative figure (into parentheses) implies 
a positive transfer from country B to country A. The matrix is thus skew-symmetric. 
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Appendix 8: Matrix of net allowance flows (Mt), 2005-07 combined 
 
Note: All figures in the matrix stand for a net transfer from country A to country B. A negative figure (into parentheses) implies 
a positive transfer from country B to country A. The matrix is thus skew-symmetric. 
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